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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
Willie Tyler was charged under state law for the 
murder of Doreen Proctor, a witness who was scheduled to 
testify at his brother’s state trial. Tyler was acquitted of the 
murder charge but convicted of witness intimidation and 
served a term in state prison. After his release, federal 
prosecutors brought charges for witness tampering by murder 
and by intimidation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512. At 
Tyler’s federal trial, the jury was instructed about two legal 
theories by which the Government could prove its case—
tampering with a witness to prevent her testimony at an 
official proceeding and tampering with a witness to prevent 
her communication with law enforcement. Tyler was found 
3 
 
guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, and his conviction 
was affirmed on appeal. Tyler now argues that two recent 
Supreme Court decisions, Arthur Andersen LLP v. United 
States and Fowler v. United States, limited the scope of the 
witness tampering statute and have rendered non-criminal the 
acts for which he was convicted. We conclude that these 
intervening Supreme Court decisions along with the evidence 
in the record supports Tyler’s actual innocence claim. For this 
reason, we will remand to the District Court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing and provide Tyler an opportunity to 
present evidence in support of his actual innocence.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual History 
Doreen Proctor’s body was found on the side of a 
country road in Adams County, Pennsylvania on April 21, 
1992, shot in the head and chest, badly beaten, and stabbed 
repeatedly. She had been scheduled to testify that day as a 
witness against David Tyler, Appellant Willie Tyler’s brother, 
in Pennsylvania state court.
1
 In her role as a confidential 
informant for the Carlisle Police Department, Proctor had 
made four controlled buys of cocaine from Tyler and from 
three other individuals, Jerome “Butchie” Evans, Mary Jane 
Hodge and Cindy Brooks, in early 1991. Proctor had testified 
against the four individuals at their preliminary hearing, and 
in January 1992, she testified at Hodge’s trial leading to a 
conviction. After Proctor’s death, the remaining trials were 
halted.  
                                              
1
 We will refer to Willie Tyler as “Tyler” and David 
Tyler as “David.” 
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Instead, in July 1992, Tyler, along with David and 
David’s girlfriend Roberta Ronique Bell, were charged under 
state law with criminal homicide and witness intimidation in 
connection with Proctor’s death. Tyler was acquitted of the 
murder but convicted of witness intimidation, David was 
convicted of murder, and Bell was acquitted of all charges. 
Willie Tyler was sentenced to two to four years in state 
prison.  
Federal law enforcement officers began a subsequent 
investigation into Proctor’s death, and in June 1995, Bell was 
charged with witness tampering and intimidation. After a jury 
trial, Bell was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1347 (3d Cir. 1997). In 
April 1996, after his release from state prison, Tyler was 
charged by federal authorities with murder and intimidation 
of a witness in connection with Proctor’s death.  
The evidence revealed that on April 20, 1992, 
following a meeting between David and Jerome Evans, David 
recounted the conversation to Tyler and then stated, “[t]hat 
bitch is going to die tonight.” App. 429. Shortly thereafter, 
David went to a shed outside of Hodge’s house, returned with 
a sawed-off shotgun and asked Tyler whether he knew how to 
cock the gun, and Tyler demonstrated that he knew how to do 
so. That night, Roberta Bell asked a friend to babysit her kids. 
The next morning, Tyler and David returned to Mary Jane 
Hodge’s home where Tyler said “It’s over, she’s gone,” and 
David reported, “she’s dead, and I’ll be at court . . . and that 
bitch won’t.” App. 435. That same morning, Bell returned 
home with an armful of bloody clothes and told her 
babysitting friend to say she had been home all night. The 
friend overheard an argument between Tyler, David, and Bell 
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during which Bell told Tyler, “I shot Doreen but you killed 
her.” App. 521.  
B. Proctor’s Involvement with Law Enforcement 
The Tri-County Drug Task Force, a joint anti-drug 
effort by state and local law enforcement officers from 
Cumberland, York, and Perry Counties in Pennsylvania was 
coordinated by Special Agent Ronald Diller of the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Bureau of Narcotics 
Investigation. In early 1992, at the time of Proctor’s death, no 
federal agent or agency was part of the Task Force. However, 
a Memorandum of Understanding stated that each Task Force 
coordinator should evaluate state and local cases to determine 
which should be referred to the federal Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA). While a Task Force officer was 
initially responsible for his or her own confidential 
informants, at the conclusion of an investigation and trial, 
Special Agent Diller would generally meet with the 
investigating officers to determine whether there was any 
potential to expand the investigation. If a case was under 
consideration for federal involvement, Diller would join the 
investigating officer in debriefing the informant, and at that 
point, Diller would decide whether to bring the case to the 
DEA. Diller estimated that he had brought to the DEA three 
to five of the Task Force’s cases each year for federal 
prosecution.  
Though Diller was neither paid by any federal agency 
nor authorized to seize drugs or get a search warrant on behalf 
of the DEA, for certain investigations in the past, he had been 
deputized to act on the DEA’s behalf when he would be 
traveling outside of Pennsylvania with a federal agent. Diller 
later testified that he would advise and consult with the DEA 
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but ultimately conceded that he had never previously used the 
terms “advisor” or “consultant” and instead had borrowed 
them from an Assistant U.S. Attorney’s affidavit.  
 
Doreen Proctor had worked as an informant for 
Carlisle Police Detective David Fones, an officer with the 
Tri-County Drug Task Force. At the time of her death, 
Proctor no longer engaged in undercover operations but had 
continued to provide Fones with information on the drug 
market, including local drug activity in Harrisburg and non-
local activity about David’s drug sources in New York and 
Jamaica. Diller had also spoken on occasion with Proctor 
during 1991 and 1992 during Fones’s investigation into 
David and his co-conspirators. While Diller had spoken with 
Proctor about the local drug activity, at the time of Proctor’s 
death, Diller had not learned about Proctor’s non-local 
information involving the New York and Jamaica drug 
market. Diller planned, however, to fully debrief Proctor after 
the conclusion of David’s investigation and trial, in 
accordance with his general practice, and to then decide 
whether to expand the investigation and involve federal 
authorities. Diller later testified that had he known about 
Proctor’s knowledge on David’s drug connections in New 
York and Jamaica, the information would have been a 
significant factor in developing a federal case, and a DEA 
agent also contended that he would be interested in pursuing a 
federal case that involved Jamaican and New York drug 
connections. Nevertheless, at the time of Proctor’s death, 
Diller had neither contacted any federal agency to discuss 
developing a federal case involving Proctor nor planned to 
use her as a witness in a federal proceeding. There was also 
no ongoing state investigations involving Proctor at the time 
of her death, and while Proctor had agreed to testify at the 
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remaining trials of David and the other defendants, she had 
previously testified that she would no longer engage in 
undercover drug operations.  
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Willie Tyler is no stranger to this Court. After Tyler’s 
state trial in which he was acquitted of murdering a witness 
and convicted of intimidating a witness, Tyler was federally 
charged with witness tampering by murder and by 
intimidation in connection with Proctor’s death, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(1)(A) and (C) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1512(b)(1), (2), and (3), respectively. In August 1996, 
following a jury trial, Tyler was convicted of witness 
tampering, and on appeal, we reversed the conviction and 
granted a new trial based on grounds not relevant here. United 
States v. Tyler (Tyler I), 164 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 1998); see 
also United States v. Tyler (Tyler II), 281 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 
2002). Tyler was re-tried, and in August 2000, a jury found 
Tyler guilty of two counts of tampering with a witness—by 
murder and by intimidation. He was later sentenced to life 
imprisonment, and on direct appeal, we affirmed the 
conviction. Tyler II, 281 F.3d at 101.
2
  
In December 2009, Tyler filed a pro se motion, 
arguing that Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 
696 (2005), had rendered his conduct non-criminal. The 
Supreme Court had held in Arthur Andersen that certain 
official proceeding provisions of § 1512’s witness 
                                              
2
 Tyler’s conviction has survived several collateral 
attacks, including a § 2255 motion and other motions 
construed as successive § 2255 motions. United States v. 
Tyler, 207 F. App’x 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006).  
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intimidation subsection, § 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B), require that 
the Government prove a “nexus” between the defendant’s 
conduct and a particular federal proceeding. 544 U.S. at 707-
08. While his motion was pending, the Supreme Court 
decided Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045, 2952 
(2011), holding that an investigation-related communication 
provision of § 1512’s witness murder subsection, 
§ 1512(a)(1)(C), required that there be a reasonable likelihood 
that a witness’s murder was intended to prevent 
communication with a federal law enforcement officer or 
judge. Tyler later supplemented his pro se motion to address 
Fowler. The District Court construed his motions as a petition 
for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which it denied in March 
2012. Tyler appealed. 
III. ANALYSIS
3
 
A. Availability of Section 2241 Relief 
Prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, federal 
prisoners could seek post-conviction relief through the writ of 
habeas corpus, codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Section 
2255, however, was enacted as an alternative to the writ of 
habeas corpus to allow prisoners to seek collateral review in 
the trial court where the case was prosecuted. In re 
                                              
3
 Tyler, who is incarcerated in Lewisburg, 
Pennsylvania, filed his pro se habeas petition in the District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241. The District Court dismissed the petition for 
lack of jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction to review the 
District Court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997); see also United 
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1952). Section 2255 
was later amended to restrict the ability of prisoners to file 
successive petitions. Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 106, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).  
However, even after § 2255 was enacted, a writ of 
habeas corpus under § 2241 remained available for prisoners 
under limited circumstances, including when § 2255 is 
“inadequate” or “ineffective,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), also 
known as § 2255’s “safety valve.” We have held that a § 2255 
petition is “inadequate” when a petitioner asserts a claim of 
“actual innocence” on the theory that “he is being detained 
for conduct that has subsequently been rendered non-criminal 
by an intervening Supreme Court decision” and our own 
precedent construing an intervening Supreme Court decision, 
but is otherwise barred from challenging the legality of the 
conviction under § 2255. Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 252. Such a 
situation “presents exceptional circumstances where the need 
for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is 
apparent.” Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Under those circumstances, we will remand to the district 
court to consider the record and determine whether the 
petitioner is actually innocent, that is whether the petitioner’s 
conduct had been rendered non-criminal due to the Supreme 
Court decision as well as our own precedent construing the 
Supreme Court’s decision. Id. at 252. To support an actual 
innocence claim, the petitioner must “establish that ‘in light 
of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted him.’” United States v. 
Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Bousley v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)). A petitioner can 
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establish that no reasonable juror would have convicted him 
by demonstrating an intervening change in law that rendered 
his conduct non-criminal. See United States v. Davies, 394 
F.3d 182, 191 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Bousley, 523 U.S. at 
620). While Bousley addressed the standard that a petitioner 
must meet for claims brought under § 2255, this standard 
applies equally to actual innocence claims brought under § 
2241. See, e.g., Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th 
Cir. 2006); Martin v. Perez, 319 F.3d 799, 804 (6th Cir. 
2003).  
In the instant action, Tyler contends that he is actually 
innocent and being detained for conduct that has subsequently 
been rendered non-criminal due to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 in Arthur Andersen and 
Fowler and by our precedent construing those Supreme Court 
decisions. If Tyler’s contention is correct, “the proper 
procedure under Bousley is to remand to the district court to 
determine whether a defendant is actually innocent of the 
charged offense when the record supports such a claim.” 
Garth, 188 F.3d at 109. Thus, we must evaluate whether the 
record supports Tyler’s claim of actual innocence and if so 
whether he is eligible for § 2241 relief.  
B. The Victim and Witness Protection Act 
The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 
(VWPA) was enacted to provide protection to witnesses in 
federal cases. The VWPA contains two key provisions, which 
follow. The first section addresses witness tampering by 
murder of a witness: 
Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person, 
with intent to— 
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(A) prevent the attendance or testimony of 
any person in an official proceeding; . . . or 
(C) prevent the communication by any 
person to a law enforcement officer or judge 
of the United States of information relating 
to the commission or possible commission 
of a Federal offense or a violation of 
conditions of probation, parole, or release 
pending judicial proceedings; 
shall be punished . . . .  
 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1) (emphasis added). The second 
section addresses witness tampering through 
intimidation or threats toward a witness: 
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, 
threatens, or corruptly persuades another 
person, or attempts to do so, or engages in 
misleading conduct toward another person, with 
intent to— 
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the 
testimony of any person in an official 
proceeding; 
(2) cause or induce any person to— 
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a 
record, document, or other object, from 
an official proceeding; 
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an 
object with intent to impair the object’s 
integrity or availability for use in an 
official proceeding; . . . or 
(D) be absent from an official proceeding 
to which such person has been 
summoned by legal process; or 
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(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the 
communication to a law enforcement officer 
or judge of the United States . . . 
     shall be [punished]. 
 
Id. § 1512(b) (emphasis added). As the text of the law shows, 
both sections prohibit conduct targeted at official proceedings 
and at investigation-related communication with law 
enforcement officers. To constitute an “official proceeding” 
under § 1512, the proceeding must be before “a judge or court 
of the United States.” Id. § 1515(a)(1)(A). A law enforcement 
officer includes “an officer or employee of the Federal 
Government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of 
the Federal Government or serving the Federal Government 
as an adviser or consultant.” Id. § 1515(a)(4).  
 Tyler was convicted of tampering with a witness by 
murder in violation of an official proceeding provision
4
 and 
an investigation-related communication provision
5
 (Count 2). 
He was also convicted of tampering with a witness by 
intimidation and threats in violation of two official 
proceeding provisions
6
 and an investigation-related 
communication provision
7
 (Count 3).  
                                              
4
 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A). 
5
 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). 
6
 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) and (b)(2). 
7
 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). 
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C. Judicial Limitations on Use of Victim and Witness 
Protection Act 
 The Supreme Court addressed certain provisions of § 
1512 in Arthur Andersen and Fowler, and we recently 
reconciled the Supreme Court’s holdings in those two cases in 
United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2012), 
vacated on other grounds by Shavers v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2877 (2013).
8
 We will review these holdings to determine 
whether they render Tyler’s conduct non-criminal.  
1. Limitations from Arthur Andersen and Fowler 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur Andersen 
required that for the government to satisfy the VWPA’s 
witness intimidation section’s “official proceeding” 
requirement, § 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B), it must prove a 
“nexus” between the defendant’s conduct and a foreseeable 
particular proceeding. Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707-08. 
Specifically, the government must prove that the defendant 
sought to interfere with evidence or a witness and acted “in 
contemplation [of a] particular official proceeding.” Id. at 
708. “[I]f the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are 
likely to affect the [official] proceeding,” then “he lacks the 
requisite intent to obstruct.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
                                              
8
 Our judgment in Shavers was subsequently vacated 
by the Supreme Court in light of Alleyne v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Shavers, 133 S. Ct. at 2877. Because 
Alleyne involves an unrelated sentencing issue, the Supreme 
Court’s vacatur does not affect our holding in Shavers with 
regard to the extension of Arthur Andersen’s nexus 
requirement and Fowler’s reasonable likelihood requirement 
to other provisions in § 1512.  
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omitted). The “official proceeding” language is also 
contained in § 1512(a)(1)(A), (b)(1), and (b)(2), the 
provisions under which Tyler was convicted.  
In 2011, the Supreme Court in Fowler analyzed the 
investigation-related communication provision in the 
VWPA’s witness murder section, § 1512(a)(1)(C), which 
requires that the murder of a witness is intended to “prevent 
the communication by any person to a law enforcement 
officer.” The Court held that “in a case . . . where the 
defendant does not have particular federal law enforcement 
officers in mind[] the Government must show a reasonable 
likelihood that, had . . . the victim communicated with law 
enforcement officers, at least one relevant communication 
would have been made to a federal law enforcement officer.” 
Fowler, 131 S. Ct. at 2052. The Supreme Court noted that the 
“reasonable likelihood” standard was necessary to prevent 
“transform[ation of] a federally oriented statute into a statute 
that would deal with crimes, investigations, and witness 
tampering that, as a practical matter, are purely state in 
nature.” Id. The Court emphasized that the Government must 
show more than “a mere possibility that a communication 
would have been with federal officials” and “that the 
likelihood of communication to a federal officer was more 
than remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical.” Id. at 2051-
52. 
2. Reconciling These Limitations in Shavers  
In United States v. Shavers, which we decided after the 
District Court’s denial of Tyler’s § 2241 petition, we 
reconciled the Supreme Court’s holdings in Arthur Andersen 
and Fowler. 693 F.3d at 378-79. While the Arthur Andersen 
Court only specifically addressed the nexus requirement in 
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the official proceeding provisions of § 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B), 
we held that the analysis applies “with equal force to 
§ 1512(b)(1),” which also was qualified by an official 
proceeding. Id. at 378. Reasoning that “[c]onsistency 
demand[ed] that we apply the Arthur Andersen nexus 
requirement to § 1512(b)(1),” we held that the Government 
was required to “prov[e] that the defendant contemplated a 
particular ‘official proceeding’ that was foreseeable when he 
or she engaged in the proscribed conduct.” Id. While we did 
not address the other provisions in § 1512 that were also 
qualified by an official proceeding, based on our view of what 
“consistency demands,” we implied that Arthur Andersen’s 
nexus requirement would apply to all § 1512 provisions 
proscribing conduct intended to affect an official proceeding.  
We also considered Fowler’s “reasonable likelihood” 
requirement for the investigation-related communication 
provision and rejected the view that it would apply to an 
official proceeding provision, § 1512(b)(1). We concluded 
that for the same reasons that Arthur Andersen’s nexus 
requirement does not apply to the investigation-related 
communication provisions, it would be “illogical” to apply 
Fowler’s reasonable likelihood requirement in the context of 
prosecutions under the official proceeding provisions. Id. at 
379. Instead, we recognized that each of the § 1512 categories 
was subject to a different set of requirements, concluding that 
“there are at least two lines of jurisprudence developing 
separately under the VWPA: one for the investigation-related 
provisions, such as § 1512(b)(3) and (a)(1)(C), and one for 
the ‘official proceeding’ provisions, such as § 1512(b)(1) and 
(b)(2).” Id. 
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D. Effect of Intervening Supreme Court Decisions on 
Tyler’s Convictions 
1. Official Proceeding: Nexus Requirement 
 Tyler contends that  his conduct has been rendered 
non-criminal by the Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur 
Andersen because there was no evidence from which the 
Government could establish a nexus with an official 
proceeding. The District Court, though, held that Arthur 
Andersen did not establish that Tyler was actually innocent of 
his witness tampering offenses. It recognized that other 
Circuits have held that Arthur Andersen’s nexus requirement 
applies to other VWPA provisions containing the official 
proceedings language. United States v. Tyler, No. 1:96-CR-
106, 2012 WL 951479, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2012) (citing 
United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 
2009) and United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d 698, 707-08 
(7th Cir. 2007)). However, it reasoned that because the 
conduct at issue in Arthur Andersen was “by itself not 
inherently wrong,” a nexus requirement was necessary to 
ensure that “innocent conduct is not punished,” whereas 
Tyler’s conduct involved “consciousness of wrongdoing” so 
no such nexus requirement was necessary. Id., at *9-10. Thus, 
it disagreed with the holdings of these Circuits and held that 
Arthur Andersen’s nexus requirement does not apply to § 
1512(a)(1)(A) and (C) and § 1512(b)(1) and (b)(3), because 
“Arthur Andersen has not altered the legal landscape for all 
section 1512 offenses.” Id., at *10.  
The District Court’s holding is in sharp contrast with 
our subsequent holding in Shavers. There we expressly held 
that the nexus requirement for official proceedings extends to 
§ 1512(b)(1) and implied that the nexus requirement would 
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apply likewise to other obstructive conduct involving an 
official proceeding proscribed by § 1512. We similarly 
conclude here that in any prosecution brought under a § 1512 
provision charging obstruction of justice involving an 
“official proceeding,” the government is required to prove a 
nexus between the defendant’s conduct and a particular 
official proceeding before a judge or court of the United 
States that the defendant contemplated. Arthur Andersen, 544 
U.S. at 708. This holding is in line with our sister Circuits that 
have all concluded that the nexus requirement applies to other 
§ 1512 provisions qualified by an official proceeding. See 
United States v. Bennett, 664 F.3d 997, 1013 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(applying nexus requirement to § 1512(c)(2)), vacated on 
other grounds by 133 S. Ct. 71 (2012); United States v. 
Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); 
Phillips, 583 F.3d at 1263-64 (same); United States v. 
Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 584 (6th Cir. 2009) (same); Matthews, 
505 F.3d at 707-08 (applying nexus requirement to § 
1512(c)(1)); United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 126 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (applying nexus requirement to § 1512(b)(1)). 
Having considered the effect of Arthur Andersen on 
the § 1512 official proceeding provisions, we now must 
examine whether the evidence in the record is consistent with 
Tyler’s claim that he is actually innocent of violating § 
1512’s official proceeding provisions. We emphasize that our 
review “does not amount to a determination of whether there 
is sufficient evidence to convict,” but only considers whether 
the evidence supports Tyler’s actual innocence claim “such 
that remand is required to allow [him] an opportunity to 
establish his actual innocence.” Garth, 188 F.3d at 110. We 
believe that it does.  
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In Shavers, we considered the evidence presented at 
trial and concluded that it was insufficient as a matter of law 
to satisfy the official proceedings requirement because the 
defendant’s conduct was directed at preventing a witness 
from testifying in a state court proceeding and because there 
was no evidence that the defendant contemplated another 
proceeding. 693 F.3d at 379-80. Tyler’s case is no different. 
Similar to Shavers, there was no evidence that Tyler’s 
conduct was directed at preventing Proctor’s testimony at 
anything other than as a witness to a state drug offense at 
Tyler’s brother’s state trial, or that Tyler contemplated a 
federal proceeding. Special Agent Diller conceded at Tyler’s 
trial that at the time of Proctor’s death he had not contacted 
any federal agency to discuss a federal case involving Proctor 
as a federal witness and there was no plan to use her in a 
federal proceeding. Indeed, in considering the appeal of 
Tyler’s co-conspirator, we concluded that “there was no 
federal proceeding contemplated at the time of Proctor’s 
murder.” Bell, 113 F.3d at 1348.9 Thus, based on our review 
                                              
9
 We also concluded that Diller’s testimony could not 
“be construed to mean that the Task Force had already 
decided at the time of Proctor’s murder to make a federal case 
out of the drug trade in which Tyler, Bell, and others were 
engaged, or that it had even thought about doing so.” United 
States v. Bell, 113 F.3d at 1348 n.2. Nevertheless, we upheld 
Bell’s conviction based on our then-existing interpretation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1512. We found that “while the evidence may 
lend itself more obviously to the theory that Bell killed 
Proctor in order to prevent her from testifying a few hours 
later at [David] Tyler’s trial, it also supports the inference that 
Bell believed Proctor was going to continue to communicate 
with the Task Force concerning drug crimes that Bell and 
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of the record, we have uncovered no evidence to satisfy 
Arthur Andersen’s requirement that the Government prove a 
nexus between Tyler’s conduct and a foreseeable particular 
federal proceeding to establish a conviction under 
§ 1512(a)(1)(A), (b)(1), and (b)(2). For this reason, we 
conclude that there is not enough in the record to negate 
Tyler’s claim that he is actually innocent of tampering with a 
witness involved in an official proceeding. Accordingly, the 
District Court has jurisdiction to consider Tyler’s § 2241 
petition and provide him with an opportunity to establish his 
actual innocence under the official proceeding provisions. 
 2. Investigation-Related Communications: 
Reasonable Likelihood Test 
Tyler also argues that Fowler has rendered his conduct 
non-criminal under § 1512’s investigation-related 
communication provisions because the Government failed to 
establish that there was a reasonable likelihood that Proctor 
would communicate with federal law enforcement officers. 
The District Court, however, held that Fowler did not aid 
Tyler in establishing his actual innocence. Because we had 
affirmed Tyler’s conviction based on the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the District Court presumed that the evidence must 
                                                                                                     
others had committed.” Id. at 1350. In Tyler’s direct appeal, 
we relied on our holding in Bell for the view that § 1512 
“does not require that the defendant know or intend anything 
with respect to this federal character,” Tyler II, 281 F.3d at 92 
(quoting Bell, 113 F.3d at 1348), an interpretation that is no 
longer correct under Arthur Andersen. As a result, we upheld 
Tyler’s conviction, reasoning that “the evidence presented at 
trial demonstrated Tyler knew Doreen Proctor would be 
testifying against his brother in a federal prosecution.” Id.  
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also have satisfied Fowler’s “reasonable likelihood” test. 
Tyler, 2012 WL 951479, at *12. However, the District Court 
did not consider that our affirmance incorporated our pre-
Fowler interpretation of § 1512 that a conviction may be 
based on “proof that the officers with whom [Tyler] believed 
[Proctor] might communicate would in fact be federal 
officers.” Tyler II, 281 F.3d at 100 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), and not whether a reasonable jury 
could find that the evidence established a reasonable 
likelihood that Proctor would communicate with federal 
officers.  
Our pre-Fowler interpretation of § 1512 comes from 
United States v. Stansfield, where we held that the 
investigation-related communication provision of the witness 
murder section, § 1512(a)(1)(C), only required proof that “the 
defendant believed that the [witness] might communicate 
with the federal authorities.” 101 F.3d 909, 918 (3d Cir. 
1996). We also permitted the jury to infer this element “from 
the fact that the offense was federal in nature, plus additional 
appropriate evidence.” Id. We found our framework an 
appropriate balance between the requirement that the 
government must prove the “defendant’s specific intent to 
hinder a federal investigation” without imposing an 
unnecessary hurdle by proving “the defendant knew the 
federal status of any particular law enforcement officer 
involved in an investigation.” Id. at 919. But Fowler reached 
a different balance, requiring instead that the jury find that if 
Tyler did not have a particular federal law enforcement 
officer in mind, then the Government must establish “a 
reasonable likelihood” that had Proctor “communicated with 
law enforcement officers, at least one relevant 
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communication would have been made to a federal law 
enforcement officer.” 131 S. Ct. at 2052 (emphasis omitted).  
Fowler thus calls into question Stansfield’s 
requirement that the government only prove that the 
defendant believe the witness “might” communicate with 
federal law enforcement. First, our use of the term “might” 
permitted a mere possibility rather than a reasonable 
likelihood, which fails to comport with the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that a reasonable likelihood requires more than “a 
mere possibility” or “that the likelihood of communication to 
a federal officer was more than remote, outlandish, or simply 
hypothetical.” Fowler, 131 S. Ct. at 2051-52. Worse, that we 
permitted an inference of the element further violated Fowler 
by “transform[ing] a federally oriented statute into a statute 
that would deal with crimes, investigations, and witness 
tampering that, as a practical matter, are purely state in 
nature.” Fowler, 131 S. Ct. at 2052. In light of this, it is 
necessary for us to revise the elements for a § 1512 
investigation-related communication offense.  
In Stansfield, we held that to establish a conviction 
under the investigation-related communication provision of 
the witness murder section of the VWPA, the government 
must prove: 
 (1) the defendant killed or attempted to kill a 
person; (2) the defendant was motivated by a 
desire to prevent the communication between 
any person and law enforcement authorities 
concerning the commission or possible 
commission of an offense; (3) that offense was 
actually a federal offense; and (4) the defendant 
believed that the person in (2) above might 
communicate with the federal authorities.  
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101 F.3d at 918. We now hold that in addition to the first 
three Stansfield elements as applied to the murder or 
intimidation of a witness, the government must establish a 
reasonable likelihood that the person whom the defendant 
believes may communicate with law enforcement would in 
fact make a relevant communication with a federal law 
enforcement officer.
10
 To establish this reasonable likelihood, 
“there must be evidence—not merely argument” of the 
witness’s cooperation with law enforcement, United States v. 
Lopez, 372 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted), 
vacated on other grounds by 125 S. Ct. 1613. Nevertheless, 
just as Fowler specifically noted that § 1512 reaches conduct 
that occurs before the victim had any communications with 
law enforcement officers, 131 S. Ct. at 2049, here, too, we 
emphasize that “the government need not prove that a federal 
investigation was in progress at the time the defendant 
committed [a] witness-tampering” offense. United States v. 
Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d 487, 498 (4th Cir. 2012).  
Having concluded that the intervening change in law 
again supports Tyler’s claim of actual innocence of violating 
the investigation-related communication provisions, we will 
consider the evidence that the Government presented to 
satisfy the reasonable likelihood test. If the Government 
failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that at least one of 
Proctor’s communications with law enforcement would have 
                                              
10
 Although this panel lacks the authority to overrule 
precedential opinions from a prior panel, we may reevaluate 
our precedent in light of an intervening Supreme Court 
decision. Inst. Inv. Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 276 
n.50 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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been with a federal law enforcement officer, then we must 
remand to the District Court. See Fowler, 131 S. Ct. at 2053 
(noting that it would “leave . . . to the lower courts to 
determine whether, and how, the [reasonable likelihood] 
standard applies”). In this case, the Government introduced 
evidence that Proctor had communicated with Pennsylvania 
Special Agent Diller, that Diller would advise and consult 
with the DEA, and that he planned to fully debrief Proctor 
after David Tyler’s trial concluded to determine whether to 
expand the investigation. Yet, in violation of Fowler and 
based on our prior erroneous interpretation of § 1512, the jury 
was only required to find “that the officers with whom [Tyler] 
believed [Proctor] might communicate would be in fact 
federal officers.” App. 687 (emphasis added). Having 
reviewed the record as it now stands, we conclude that there 
is enough evidence to support Tyler’s claim that he is actually 
innocent of violating § 1512’s investigation-related 
communication provisions.  
E. Procedure on Remand 
 Having concluded that the record supports Tyler’s 
claim of actual innocence on both the official proceedings 
legal theory and the investigation-related communication 
legal theory, we hold that the District Court erred in 
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Tyler’s § 
2241 petition rather than providing him with an opportunity 
to demonstrate his actual innocence. See Garth, 188 F.3d at 
109, 114; see also Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 252 (remanding to 
district court after concluding that petitioner’s § 2241 claim 
“is not so devoid of merit that it should be foreclosed by us at 
this stage”). On remand, the District Court shall conduct an 
evidentiary hearing, in accordance with Bousley, to allow 
Tyler to prove his claim of actual innocence. Tyler is free to 
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“rest on the record as it now stands,” and the Government 
may present additional admissible evidence to refute Tyler’s 
actual innocence claim. Garth, 188 F.3d at 110 n.13, 114.  
 If the District Court concludes that Tyler has met his 
burden of establishing his actual innocence as to both 
theories, then it must issue the writ of habeas corpus and 
vacate Tyler’s convictions, pursuant to § 2241. If, however, 
the District Court concludes that Tyler has met his burden of 
establishing his actual innocence based on either the official 
proceeding provisions or the investigation-related 
communication provisions, but not both, then it must fashion 
a remedy in light of the general verdict reached in this case. 
The jury was instructed that the Government could prove its 
case on each of the witness tampering counts based on either 
of two legal theories: (1) tampering to prevent the person’s 
testimony in an official proceeding; or (2) tampering to 
prevent the person’s communication to a law enforcement 
officer. Because the jury returned a general verdict on both 
counts, we are unable to determine the legal theory on which 
it based its verdict.  
Generally, when a jury returns a general verdict and 
the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction on one 
legal theory but sufficient to convict on another theory, then 
the reviewing court should let the verdict stand, assuming that 
the jury convicted on the factually sufficient theory. United 
States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing 
Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1991)). 
However, when “one of two or more alternative theories 
supporting a count of conviction is either (1) unconstitutional, 
or (2) legally invalid, then the reviewing court should vacate 
the jury verdict and remand for a new trial without the invalid 
or unconstitutional theory.” Id. (citing Griffin, 502 U.S. at 
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56). This is because “a jury is presumed to be able to 
distinguish factually sufficient evidence from factually 
insufficient evidence,” but “is not presumed, however, to be 
able to distinguish accurate statements of law from inaccurate 
statements.” Id. (citing Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59). A legal theory 
is invalid when, as here, “the indictment or the district court’s 
jury instructions are based on an erroneous interpretation of 
law or contain a mistaken description of the law.” Id. at 145. 
Thus, if the District Court concludes that Tyler has failed to 
establish his actual innocence based on one but not both legal 
theories, then it may not let the verdict stand, and instead it 
must order a new trial based only on the legally valid theory.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, we remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 The Majority and I agree that if Willie Tyler can meet 
the “actual innocence” standard to invoke § 2255’s “safety 
valve,” then he would be permitted to file a petition under § 
2241.  Maj. Typescript at 8-9.  I depart from the Majority, 
however, because I understand the actual innocence standard 
to require us to consider whether a reasonable, properly 
instructed juror would have convicted Tyler and applying this 
standard to the present record supports a conclusion that Tyler 
has not met the actual innocence standard and that the order 
of the District Court should be affirmed.   Further, unlike my 
colleagues, I conclude that the general verdict in this case 
does not impact our ability on habeas review to evaluate 
whether a reasonable, properly instructed juror would have 
convicted Tyler. 
I. 
 Under Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), 
and Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), to demonstrate 
“actual innocence,” a habeas petitioner must show that, in 
light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable, properly instructed juror would have convicted 
him.
1
  Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-29.   
                                              
1
 This strict standard is appropriate.  The actual 
innocence standard seeks to “balance the societal interests in 
finality . . . and conservation of scarce judicial resources with 
the individual interest in justice that arises in the 
extraordinary case.”  Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.  To reflect this 
balance, the actual innocence standard is therefore 
purposefully “demanding” and was formulated to ensure that 
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Tyler was convicted of violating the Victim and 
Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1512, which 
makes it unlawful to, among other things, tamper with a 
person, by murder or intimidation, with the intent to prevent 
that person from participating in an “official proceeding” or 
to tamper with a person, by murder or intimidation, with the 
intent to prevent that person from communicating with a “law 
enforcement officer.”2  As the Majority notes, after Tyler’s 
trial, the Supreme Court clarified the VWPA’s federal nexus 
requirement under both the official proceeding provisions and 
the law enforcement investigation-related provisions in 
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005), 
and Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045 (2011), 
respectively.  Maj. Typescript at 10-14.  Because the jury was 
instructed before these cases were decided, the District 
Court’s instructions were based on an interpretation of the 
VWPA that, though correct at the time, was ultimately 
                                                                                                     
a successful petitioner’s case is “truly extraordinary.”  House 
v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537-38 (2006) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted); see also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 
1924, 1928 (2013) (noting that a showing of actual innocence 
may “serve[] as a gateway” through an “impediment” that 
otherwise bars consideration of a petitioner’s claim). 
2
 Because § 1512 is written in the disjunctive, the 
official proceeding provisions and the law enforcement 
investigation-related provisions are alternative ways of 
committing the same offense.  18 U.S.C. § 1512; see also 
United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 208 (3d Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (noting that Congress’s “use of disjunctive language 
creates alternative ways of violating a statute” and that such 
language “created a single offense that may be committed in 
alternative ways”).    
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rendered erroneous.  Accordingly, the jury was instructed 
under theories that are now “legally invalid.”  See United 
States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 145 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that 
a legal theory is invalid where “the indictment or the district 
court’s jury instructions are based on an erroneous 
interpretation of law or contain a mistaken description of the 
law.”).  As I understand the Supreme Court’s cases on actual 
innocence, however, that is just the beginning of our inquiry.  
To apply the actual innocence standard, we must also identify 
the proper instructions for the crime charged and evaluate the 
record in light of these instructions to determine if a 
reasonable, properly instructed juror would have convicted 
Tyler.
3
   
Because “‘[a]ctual innocence’ means factual 
innocence, not mere legal insufficiency,” a showing that the 
jury was instructed on a legally invalid theory alone does not 
satisfy the actual innocence standard.  Bousley, 523 U.S. at 
                                              
3
 The Majority cites United States v. Davies, 394 F.3d 
182, 191 (3d Cir. 2005), for the proposition  that “[a] 
petitioner can establish that no reasonable juror would have 
convicted him by demonstrating an intervening change in law 
that rendered his conduct noncriminal,”  Maj. Typescript at 
10.  While this is a correct statement, I part company with the 
Majority as its analysis does not include consideration of 
whether the change in the law here, as applied to the facts of 
our case, demonstrates that no reasonable juror could find that 
Tyler did not violate the law.  A court analyzing a petitioner’s 
actual innocence claim must apply the holding of the 
intervening Supreme Court decision to the record to 
determine if a reasonable juror applying such law would have 
convicted him.  See id. at 192-96. 
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623.  Bousley and Schlup require the Court to ask what a 
reasonable, properly instructed juror “would do” when 
considering the evidence presented.  Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329 
(emphasis added); see also Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623.  Unlike 
the direct appeal cases on which the Majority relies, Bousley 
and Schlup require us to ignore what the improperly 
instructed jury at Tyler’s trial actually did and direct that we 
examine the record under the current law.  As a result, legally 
invalid jury instructions given at trial alone cannot render a 
petitioner actually innocent because Bousley and Schlup 
require us to review the facts from the perspective of a 
reasonable, properly instructed juror.
4
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 Several of our sister circuits have held similarly.  
See, e.g., Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 913, 917 (7th Cir. 
2011) (“[The actual innocence] standard depends on the 
content of the trial record, not the content of the jury 
instructions.”) vacated on other grounds by Ryan v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012); Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 
895, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he mere fact of an improper 
instruction is not sufficient to meet the test for actual 
innocence.”); Bosley v. Cain, 409 F.3d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he [actual innocence] standard requires the district 
court to ‘make a probabilistic determination about what 
reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.’”) (quoting 
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). 
Moreover, at oral argument, both Tyler and the 
Government acknowledged this very point.  Oral Arg. at 
8:04-8:20 (“At this point in the litigation . . . I don’t think jury 
instructions are something I can attack.  It’s really a matter of 
establishing a lack of criminal conduct at this point.”) (May 
13, 2013); Oral Arg. at 32:23-32:34 (“When we come to 
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In Schlup, the Supreme Court set forth certain 
attributes of such a reasonable juror.  First, such a “reasonable 
juror would consider fairly all of the evidence presented.”  
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329.  Second, “such a juror would 
conscientiously obey the instructions of the trial court 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.  Finally, and 
most importantly here, courts must presume that such a juror 
has been “properly instructed.”  Id.  A “properly instructed” 
juror is a juror who has been given “completely accurate” 
instructions.  See Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 240 (3d 
Cir. 2007); Davies, 394 F.3d at 196 (reviewing an actual 
innocence claim and considering the perspective of a properly 
instructed juror).  Accordingly, if an instruction was 
erroneous when it was given, a court evaluating a claim of 
actual innocence must determine whether a correct 
instruction, in light of the record, “would change the jurors’ 
minds as to . . . guilt.”  Goldblum, 510 F.3d at 235. 
II. 
 Under this standard, the analysis is straightforward.  
As the Majority correctly points out, Arthur Andersen and 
Fowler clarified the federal nexus requirement under both the 
official proceeding provisions and the law enforcement 
investigation-related provisions.  Maj. Typescript at 10-14.  
Thus, under Bousley and Schlup, we must apply the law as it 
currently stands to the record and determine whether “it is 
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 
convicted [Tyler].”  Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (quotation 
marks and citations omitted); see also Ryan, 645 F.3d at 918 
                                                                                                     
actual innocence . . . the Court is not to consider jury 
instructions or anything else.  It is actual innocence.”) (May 
13, 2013). 
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(noting that Bousley requires a court to ask “whether, 
applying current legal standards to the trial record, [a 
petitioner] is entitled to a judgment of acquittal.”).    
 To convict on the official proceeding provisions after 
Arthur Andersen, the Government must “prov[e] that the 
defendant contemplated a particular ‘official proceeding’ that 
was foreseeable when he or she engaged in the proscribed 
conduct.”  United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 378 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  Here, I agree with the Majority, and every court 
that has reviewed the facts surrounding Proctor’s murder, that 
there is a total absence of proof of an “official proceeding,” as 
defined by the statute, of any kind, whether particular, 
foreseeable, or otherwise.  Maj. Typescript at 16-19; see also 
United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1348 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(noting, on the appeal of Tyler’s co-defendant, that “there was 
no federal proceeding contemplated at the time of Proctor’s 
murder”); United States v. Tyler, Crim. No. 96-106, 2012 WL 
951479, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2012) (“There was no 
evidence presented to show that a federal proceeding had 
been instituted, about to be instituted, or even contemplated at 
the time that Proctor was murdered.”).  As a result, under the 
law both before and after Arthur Andersen, a reasonable juror 
could not find that Tyler engaged in tampering activity with 
the intent to interfere with an official proceeding as defined 
under the VWPA.
5
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 While the Majority ostensibly remands to the District 
Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing, the directions the 
District Court must follow, Maj. Typescript at 23-25, will 
almost certainly result in a new trial for Tyler.  This is 
because the Majority instructs the District Court to vacate the 
jury’s verdict if Tyler can establish his actual innocence on 
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 This is not the case, however, for the law enforcement 
investigation-related provisions.  To convict a defendant 
under these provisions, the Government must prove that the 
defendant tampered with a witness to interfere with a 
communication from that witness to a law enforcement 
officer, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) and (b)(3), and that there 
was “a reasonable likelihood that, had . . . the victim 
communicated with law enforcement officers, at least one 
relevant communication would have been made to a federal 
law enforcement officer.”  Fowler, 131 S. Ct. at 2052 
(emphasis in original).  A “law enforcement officer” is an 
“officer or employee of the Federal Government, or a person 
authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal Government 
or serving the Federal Government as an adviser or consultant 
. . . authorized under law to engage in or supervise the 
prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of an 
offense . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(4)(A).  The Government 
need not prove that the defendant knew that the law 
enforcement officer was federal or acting as an advisor or 
consultant to the federal government.  18 U.S.C. § 
1512(g)(2). 
The record shows that a reasonable juror could have 
found that it was publicly known that Proctor had been 
cooperating with law enforcement and that it was reasonably 
likely, based upon the type of information she had and with 
                                                                                                     
just one of the two theories.  Maj. Typescript at 25.  The 
Majority has found that there is “no evidence” of an official 
proceeding.  Maj. Typescript at 18.  Thus, unless the 
Government can produce new evidence of an official 
proceeding on remand, the Majority’s instructions to the 
District Court would likely require vacatur on this ground. 
8 
 
whom she was speaking, that Proctor would have 
communicated with federal officers.   According to the trial 
record, Proctor was an informant for the Tri-County Drug 
Task Force (the “Task Force”), which was comprised of state 
and local law enforcement officers.  Richard Diller, an agent 
with the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Bureau of 
Narcotics Investigation, was the Task Force coordinator.  
Diller worked closely with, and referred cases to, federal 
agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(“DEA”).  Diller regularly advised and consulted with the 
DEA, determined whether a case should be brought to federal 
law enforcement, and, although not formally deputized, was 
authorized to develop cases on behalf of the DEA.  
When Proctor was murdered, she was an informant for 
David Fones, a local narcotics detective who worked with the 
Task Force.  Sometime before her murder, Proctor provided 
Fones with information concerning David Tyler’s source for 
cocaine in New York City and his ties to Jamaican drug 
distributors.  According to Fones, the Task Force protocol 
required Diller to evaluate information Proctor provided to 
determine if it could be used in other investigations, and, to 
this end, Fones testified that he would have met with Diller to 
discuss a further role for Proctor.  Although Diller was not 
aware of Proctor’s statements to Fones before her death, 
Diller testified that Proctor’s statements to Fones would have 
been significant in deciding whether Proctor would have been 
a federal witness, and that he intended to refer Proctor to the 
DEA as a witness.  DEA Special Agent Keith Humphreys 
testified that, had he been provided with Proctor’s statements 
to Fones, the DEA would have been interested in pursuing 
this information and Proctor would have likely been a DEA 
witness.  Based on this record, and as this Court has already 
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concluded, United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 99 (3d Cir. 
2002), a reasonable juror could find that Diller was a federal 
“law enforcement officer” for purposes of the VWPA, who 
advised and consulted with the DEA on a regular basis, 
frequently referred cases from the Task Force to federal law 
enforcement agencies, including the DEA, was the intended 
recipient of drug trafficking information from Proctor 
concerning multistate and multinational drug dealers, and 
intended to refer Proctor to the DEA.  Accordingly, a 
reasonable juror, properly instructed in accordance with 
Fowler, could find that Proctor would have communicated 
with law enforcement about drug trafficking and that there 
was a reasonable likelihood that one of these communications 
would have been made to a federal law enforcement officer.  
Because the record belies Tyler’s claim of actual innocence, I 
would affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Tyler’s 
petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
III. 
The fact that the jury returned a general verdict does 
not impact our ability to evaluate Tyler’s actual innocence 
claim.  First, the general verdict precedents upon which the 
Majority relies, Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), 
and Syme, 276 F.3d 131, are direct appeal cases that apply a 
different and less demanding standard.  As direct appeal 
cases, Griffin and Syme focus on the actions of the jury.  
Under the “actual innocence” standard applicable at this 
stage, Bousley and Schlup mandate that the focus be on proof 
of Tyler’s actual innocence and not the actions of the jury.  
Applying the perspective set forth under Griffin and Syme 
both ignores the actual innocence standard and effectively 
lessens the burden Tyler must carry to invoke § 2255(e)’s 
10 
 
safety valve,
6
 upsetting the balance the Supreme Court 
carefully struck when it formulated the demanding actual 
innocence standard.   
Second, even assuming Griffin and Syme apply, they 
do not require a different result.  Griffin states that if the 
record shows that there is sufficient evidence to support one 
theory but insufficient evidence to support another, then the 
jury is presumed to have convicted on the theory that the 
evidence supports.  Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59-60.  Here, there 
was no evidence of an official proceeding and thus a 
reasonable juror’s verdict would not have been based upon 
this theory.  This leaves one other basis, the law enforcement 
investigation-related provisions, for a reasonable juror to have 
returned a guilty verdict.  While the verdict was based on an 
improper jury instruction, the actual innocence standard 
requires that we examine the record in light of a proper 
instruction.
7
  As set forth above, there is sufficient evidence 
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 Further, the Majority’s application of Griffin and 
Syme here appears even more relaxed than it would be on 
direct appeal.  Indeed, in general verdict cases on direct 
appeal, even if a jury was instructed on a legally invalid 
theory, the verdict need not be vacated if the instructional 
error was harmless.  See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 
2896, 2934 (2010).  
7
 It is true that Syme holds that when “one of two or 
more alternative theories supporting a count of conviction is . 
. . legally invalid, then the reviewing court should vacate the 
jury verdict and remand for a new trial without the invalid or 
unconstitutional theory,” Syme, 276 F.3d at 144 (citation 
omitted), but the delivery of erroneous jury instructions alone 
11 
 
from which such a reasonable, properly instructed juror could 
have returned a guilty verdict.   Because Tyler cannot 
demonstrate that he is actually innocent on both theories of 
guilt,
8
 he cannot satisfy the actual innocence test and thus, I 
would conclude that the District Court properly dismissed his 
petition.   
 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
                                                                                                     
does not satisfy the actual innocence standard.  See infra at 3-
4. 
8
 Our decision in United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99 
(3d Cir. 1999), supports this conclusion.  In Garth, the habeas 
petitioner had pled guilty to an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c), which could be violated in one of four alternative 
ways.  Id. at 110.  After his conviction, the Supreme Court 
narrowed § 924(c) and the petitioner sought relief under § 
2255, invoking the actual innocence exception to the 
procedural default bar.  Id. at 103-05, 107-09.  The Garth 
majority found that the record supported the petitioner’s 
actual innocence claim only after reviewing the evidence on 
each of the four possible theories.  Id. at 109-114.  Thus, the 
Garth majority recognized that, in order for a petitioner to be 
actually innocent of a criminal statute with alternative means 
of committing an offense, such a petitioner must be actually 
innocent under each of the alternative theories.  The Garth 
dissent agreed with the majority on this point.  Id. at 114 
(Roth, J., dissenting) (agreeing that a petitioner must be 
actually innocent of all four alternative theories in order to be 
actually innocent of the offense charged, but, upon review of 
the record, finding that he was not actually innocent on one of 
the theories).   
